TRANSFORMATION WITHOUT A GOAL

Mongolian military transition is reported to be successful; however, the transformation is going without any goal and established concept, except for designed by U.S. advice and to get U.S. financial support.

Concept
Mongolia had no policy formulation capacity in early 1990’s, and still lacks today.
Military had enjoyed a great reputation during the Cold War, because of real threat from the PRC and real capacity of defeating the threat with Soviet assistance. Early stage of democratization did not question the reason of existence of the Mongolian People’s Army (MPA), later officially renamed Mongolian Armed Force (MAF), and MPA did not actively engage in politics, remaining professional and neutral. New democratic Constitution of 1992 guaranteed the status of MAF.
Status of MAF and its raison d’etre began to be questioned by the public debate since adoption of new constitution. Arguments were very strong. Only neighbors, but none, geopolitically, can invade Mongolia, against whom Mongolia is unable to defend itself. Therefore, there was no reason to maintain armed forces that cannot accomplish its very first task any longer. Democratization process and abolishing its Soviet – biased foreign policy, besides, helped Mongolia to normalize and improve its relation with former enemy the PRC. Absence of threat made existence of MAF non sense and the people publicly debated about the dismantling the MAF. High – ranking MAF officers were challenged to keep the Armed Force alive.
Political leaders of those days, along with military leaders, were very concerned about Mongolia’s security environment in post – cold war new international conditions and were challenged to re – evaluate its security and military threat. Neither Cabinet nor MAF had a policy developing capacity in early 1990’s. Mongolia was a Soviet satellite country and had no necessity to have an independent strategy developing institution, when the Soviet Union dictated every policy. MoD had the Institute for Defense Studies at the Military School, although, it had an obsolete capacity. With this reason, MoD established the Institute for Strategic Studies (the ISS) in 1992; however, the institute was less capable in terms of its professional experience. Even though, the institute played the primary role in developing important policy papers such as National Security Concept, National Foreign Policy Concept and Basics of Military Doctrine, all which were adopted by National Assembly.
The ISS leaders, since its establishment, paid hard efforts for research capacity building; however, the institute still lacks significant professional skills in policy development type of research, even today. Political leadership of the MoD barely cares about policy recommendation submitted by the researchers. The research products itself is in a poor quality and mainly in an old eloquent bureaucratic style, instead of a problem solving working paper. Communist bureaucratic custom of an accommodating of old high ranking officers in research institutions, so called “promotion to dump” is still practiced in Mongolia. Old obedient colonels and generals, who have no research experience, but to abide the command, are unable to criticize current government policies and develop new alternatives.
Sixteen years later, MoD and MAF still has less policy developing capacity. The government, unlike other underdeveloped countries, was not being threatened by military and pays no proper attention on MAF reform. None has a clear vision about how MAF in the 2015 will look like. The most of their policy formulation and implementation, therefore, rely on an initiative of a single high – ranking official, whoever he may be with whatever intentions.

U.S. and Foreign Initiatives
Nothing, but foreign initiatives shaped the current Mongolian military reform and its transformation. Transformation goes relatively well only if it has foreign financial incentives.
Almost the all of the successes of defense reforms, which are indeed very few, were somehow initiated by a foreign power or implemented by its financial incentives. PKO is the most successful project MoD implemented ever was supported by an active U.S. assistance. Indeed, it was one of the “three pillar policy” suggested by U.S. military attaché Thomas Wilhelm[1]. Key of success is not MoD and MAF leaders’ far – sighted policy, but the fact that U.S. military attachés somehow picked the right officers worth to cooperate, mainly who were young people. In other words, the avoiding from old communist – minded leaders was the best strategy.
MAF English training is gradually improved thanks to the English Language School of the Defense Language Institute. The first echelon of its students, who were mainly young officers in ranks from lieutenant to captain in mid 1990’s when the DLI started its program, is the most professional officer corpus of MAF, today. All of them graduated U.S. or western military schools. They were and are who led the MAF contingencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Sierra – Leona in a Multinational Force structure or under a U.N. mandate. They are the only officers who have a battle – field experience or professional mid – level bureaucrats, and who push the reform forward in a real life. These cadres, however, are still not in high decision – making level able to conceptualize and systemize the defense reform.
Establishment of civilian control is relatively well under process. The best success in this field is a legal separation of political and professional leadership. Defense related laws structurally separated the professional military staff from the political or administrative functions. A civilian minister of defense, who is a politician and responsible for political decisions, leads the ministry. Professional military officers do not resist civilian control, at least as a concept. Institute of Civil Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School plays an active role in this success. It provided the conceptual framework of the structure, which the MoD simply follows.
Russia concerned deep U.S. involvement in Mongolian military reform, is keen to maintain its control on a part of paramilitary, at least. Civil Defense Authority previously belonged to the Ministry of Defense “upgraded” its status and became Disaster Relief Agency at the Government Cabinet. A minister without portfolio heads the agency today, and the minister’s political ambition pushes him to make the agency a ministry, following the Russian example of Ministry of Emergency Situation.
China involved in neither MAF reform nor internal security type of paratroops authorities. Main reason of this may be the People’s Liberation Army has no arm to cooperate with foreign countries, nor has any experience. Chinese diplomats, besides, know that a traditional Mongolian antipathy toward China may trigger the misunderstanding in the society, if China deeply involve in any reform regard to armed force or police force.

Bare Facts, Bad Transformation
Foreign financial incentives positively impact the defense reform in Mongolia; meanwhile, it provides no self – sufficient structures, except for effective organization of money – relied corrupted institutions.
Corruption is the biggest problem in MAF as well as whole country. PKO appointment became a source of corruption in the military. Poor sergeants pay officers who has an authority to go in foreign mission whether it is PKO or in Iraq, because those foreign missions are far better paid. Going to foreign mission is a chance to increase its income for hopeless young sergeants. Several media blamed the General Staff officers for bribery. There is no system of preventing or punishing corruption in the current structure.
Civil military relation, structurally, looks good only from its surface. Reality is not that good. MoD and General Staff (GS) still do not distinguish their respective functions and many departments and agencies’ daily routine of the two are overlapped. Who should do what is one of the daily disputes between them. None clearly knows the status of the GS whether it is an agency under executive branch or a separate special service under the President. According to the Constitution, GS is functionally subordinated by the President, not under Cabinet. As opposed to it, GS is viewed one of two agencies of the MoD.
MoD civilian culture, especially, incentives for civilians staff working in defense sector is the problem. MoD staff mainly composed of old retired military officers, who identify themselves as military personnel. The civilian staff is the second ranking population in the ministry and paid the lowest salaries. Young cadres, therefore, prefer to be commissioned to officers or simply go to out from defense sector and challenge themselves in other ways. This phenomenon keeps the MoD staff less capable and more bound to old command structure. Moreover, it makes the notion of “civilian control” meaningless. None, however, cares about it.
Generals frequently run for election without retiring from military duty and sometimes politicians become generals. Three generals, have competed in a single district in 2000 election, the most of which electorates have been the military officers. Former deputy minister of Defense, who is a politician appointed by the ex – communist party to this political position, was later appointed to the position of the Chief of GS. Shortly after his appointment to GS and commissioning rank of general, he was interviewed by a journalist, where he used the word “my party” to mean the ex – communist Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party. He is still the Chief of GS. Current president of National Defense University is a former politician, who was later commissioned rank of general. Sole reason of such political appointments is the control the projects and their finances provided from abroad. Consequently, being general means being a politician or even worse, being a politician means a being general.

Conclusion
Merit of the success of Mongolian defense reform belongs not to MoD or MAF leaders, but to a foreign power suggested such reform and financial guarantee in an exact moment when MAF needed the raison d’etre. It also belongs to a new generation of officers, on whose bones and spines defense reform goes.
Every successful defense reform of Mongolia was initiated, at least supported by foreign powers, and indeed financed by those powers. Training for PKO and civilian control over military are the very good examples of it.
Such financial support, however, had negative aspects such as corruption and political appointments. The worst result of it is that MAF becomes reliant to those financial aids just like it did on Soviet assistance during the cold war. The new Armed Forces Transformation Program – 2015 is no exception for it and calculated on expected U.S. assistance from the very beginning to the very end.
The “successful” military transition of Mongolia is without goal, if not to consider the sole goal of getting money for survival.

[1] Robert D. Kaplan Imperial Grunt; The American Military on the Ground (New York: Random House, 2005) 99.